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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
ESSAYS
CONFIRMATION GRIDLOCK: THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS UNDER BILL
CLINTON AND GEORGE W. BUSH
John Anthony Maltese*
One of the most important consequences of the 2002
midterm congressional election will be its effect on federal
judicial appointments. With the same political party controlling
the White House and the Senate for the first time in eight years,
President George W. Bush should have an easier time securing
Senate confirmation of his federal judges than he did during his
first two years in office.' As of January 1, 2003, the president
had sixty vacancies to fill on the federal bench, including

* John Anthony Maltese is an associate professor of political science at the University of
Georgia. Portions of this article are based on his book, The Selling of Supreme Court
Nominees (Johns Hopkins U. Press 1995), and his paper, Judicial Selection in the Wake of
Bush v. Gore, prepared for the conference, "Final Arbiter: The U.S. Supreme Court, the
Presidency, and the Politics of Election 2000," co-sponsored by the Ray C. Bliss Institute
of Applied Politics and the Constitutional Law Center of the University of Akron School of
Law, in Akron, Ohio, in February 2002 (copy on file with author).
1. In fact, Republicans had nominal control of the Senate from January through May
2001. Despite a fifty-fifty split between Democrats and Republicans, Vice President Dick
Cheney had the tie-breaking vote in his constitutional role as president of the Senate.
Democrats regained firm control of the Senate when Republican senator James Jeffords of
Vermont became an independent in May 2001.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2003)

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

twenty-five on the courts of appeals. 2 There was also much

speculation that Bush would have the opportunity to appoint at
least one justice to the Supreme Court in 2003. 3 The last
Supreme Court vacancy had occurred in 1994 when Harry
Blackmun resigned and President Bill Clinton appointed
Stephen Breyer. With more than eight years since that vacancy,
the nation faced the longest stretch without an opening on the
Supreme Court since 1823.
That stretch had been dominated by "divided government."
Democrats controlled the White House while Republicans
controlled both houses of Congress from 1995 through 2000.
Republicans controlled the White House and the House of
Representatives while Democrats controlled the Senate from
2001 through 2002. 4 Those eight years of all but continuous
divided government were part of an emerging pattern. From
1969 through 2002, the same political party had controlled the
White House and both houses of Congress for only six out of
twenty-four years.' The same party controlled both the Senate
and the White House for only twelve of those twenty-four.6
Although divided government has been the norm since World
War II, unified government had been the norm before that.7
Divided control of the White House and the Senate has
significant ramifications for judicial appointments because
presidents only have the authority under the constitution to
nominate individuals to fill those posts. Appointment only
comes with the "advice and consent" of the Senate.
2. Various groups maintain current online lists of judicial vacancies and advocacy
concerning the vacancies. These include the liberal Alliance for Justice, which maintains a
website at <http://www.allianceforjustice.org>, and the conservative Free Congress
Foundation, which maintains a website at <http://www.judicialselection.org>.
3. See, for example, Lyle Denniston, Election 2002/Judicial Impact, Boston Globe
A40 (Nov. 7, 2002); Neil A. Lewis, Expecting a Vacancy, Bush Aides Weigh Supreme
Court Contenders, 151 N.Y. Times AI (Dec. 27, 2002).
4. As noted above, Republicans briefly controlled the Senate from. January through
May 2001, but this had no effect on judicial nominations.
5. Democrats maintained united government from 1977 through 1980, and again from
1993 through 1994.
6. Democrats controlled both the White House and the Senate from 1977 through
1980 and from 1993 through 1994. Republicans controlled both the White House and the
Senate from 1981 through 1986.
7. Samuel Kernell & Gary C. Jacobson, The Logic of American Politics 259 (2d ed.,

CQ Press 2003).
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The recent period of divided government has been
accompanied by a trend toward polarized politics in the United
States Political scientists Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher have
documented the decline in the number of "partisan
nonconformists" in Congress (which they define as "moderate
and cross-pressured Democrats and Republicans" ).9
As a result, the parties in Congress have become more
polarized, leading to a dramatic increase in partisan voting. The
trend began in the House of Representatives after the 1982
midterm elections. The trend did not emerge in the Senate until
some years later, but by the mid 1990s the Senate (as measured
by party votes) was even more partisan than the House.'
Another political scientist, Gary Jacobson, has noted that this
has been accompanied by an increase in partisanship among the
electorate: Party loyalty has increased, ticket splitting has
decreased, and the ideological gap between members of the two
parties has widened." All of this has helped to increase the
likelihood of confirmation battles over judicial nominees. It also
produced "confirmation gridlock" -a dramatic slowdown of the
confirmation process for federal judges-begun by the
Republicans after President Clinton's re-election in 1996 and
perpetuated by the Democrats in the first two years of the Bush
administration.
Polarized politics led to confirmation battles and
confirmation gridlock because judicial appointments were
thought by participants in the process to have a potentially
profound impact on public policy. White House aide Tom
Charles Huston made this clear in a 1969 memorandum to
President Richard Nixon. Huston noted that judicial nominations
were

8. Richard Fleisher & Jon R. Bond, Congress and the President in a PartisanEra, in
Polarized Politics: Congress and the President ina Partisan Era 1-8 (Jon R. Bond &
Richard Fleisher, eds., CQ Press 2000).
9. Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher, Presentation of Paper, The Disappearance of
Moderate and Cross-PressuredMembers of Congress: Conversion, Replacement and
Electoral Change (Am. Pol. Sci. Assn., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2001) (abstract on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
10. Fleisher & Bond, supra n. 8, at 3-4.
11.Gary C. Jacobson, Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral
Connection, in PolarizedPolitics: Congress and the President in a PartisanEra, supra n.
8, at 19-23.
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perhaps the least considered

aspect of Presidential

power.... In approaching the bench, it is necessary to
remember that the decision as to who will make the
decisions affects what decisions will be made. That is, the

role the judiciary will play in different historical eras
depends as much on the type of men who become judges as
it does on the constitutional rules which appear to [guide
them].2

Huston therefore urged Nixon to set specific criteria for the
types of judges to be nominated (a litmus test) in an effort to
influence judicial policymaking. If the president "establishes his
criteria and establishes his machinery for insuring that the
criteria are met, the appointments will be his, in fact, as in
theory." '" A memo from Nixon's Chief Domestic Affairs
Adviser, John Ehrlichman, that transmitted a copy of Huston's
memo to the president said: "Huston's memorandum is well
done and raises some interesting points." Underneath, Nixon
added a handwritten note: "To [Deputy Attorney General
Richard] Kleindienst: RN agrees. Have this analysis in mind
when making judicial nominations." "
When the president and the Senate are controlled by the
same political party and are in basic agreement about the
direction that they believe public policy should take, it is
relatively easy for the president to secure confirmation of his
nominees. Thus, President Franklin Roosevelt achieved with
little opposition a dramatic transformation of the Supreme Court
that had significant policy consequences. Seven of his nine
nominees were confirmed by voice vote. The remaining twoHugo Black and William 0. Douglas-were confirmed by votes

12. Memo. from Tom Charles Huston, White House aide, to President Richard Nixon,
Memorandum for the President 1-2 (Mar. 25, 1969) (available as WHCF ExFG 50, the
Judicial Branch (1969-1970), Box 1,White House Central Files, FG 50, Nixon Presidential
Materials Project, College Park, Md.) (emphasis in original) (copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).

13. Id. (emphasis in original).
14. Memo. from John D. Ehrlichman, President's Chief Domestic Affairs Advisor, to
Staff Secretary, copy to the President, Tom Huston's Memorandum re FederalJudgeships
(Mar. 27, 1969) (available in News Summaries (Mar. 1969), Box 30, President's Office
Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, College Park, Md.) (bearing Nixon's
handwritten note) (emphasis in original) (copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice

and Process).
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of sixty-three to sixteen and sixty-two to four, respectively. 5 At

the Supreme Court level, presidents have made thirty-three of
their 149 nominations when the opposition party controlled the
Senate."' Of the thirty-three nominations, only eighteen were
successful-a success rate of 54.5 percent.'7 This compares with
a success rate of almost ninety percent when the same party
controls the White House and the Senate (102 successful
nominations out of 114 nominations). 8
It is not surprising, then, that the long stretch of divided
government at the end of the twentieth-century led to what
Stephen Carter has called a "confirmation mess." "
15. See Laurence H. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court 148-49 (Random House
1985) (table).
16. I count the nominations made by presidents John Tyler and Andrew Johnson as
occurring during periods of divided government. One might quibble with this, especially in
the case of Tyler. Technically, Tyler was a member of the Whig party and Whigs
controlled the Senate, but as a southerner Tyler disagreed with many of the policy positions
of northern Whigs. (He had started out his career as a Democrat.) He was vice president
under William Henry Harrison (chosen to balance the ticket in 1836), and assumed the
presidency when Harrison died. He quickly made it clear that he would not act as a pawn
of the Whig Party. As a result, all of Harrison's original cabinet resigned in protest.
Throughout his presidency, Tyler fought bitterly with the Whig-controlled Congress, and it
was clear that Tyler was a Whig in name only. He ultimately disassociated himself from
the party. Similarly, Vice President Andrew Johnson became president when Abraham
Lincoln (a Republican) was assassinated. Johnson was a Democrat who, as senator, had
opposed secession. As a symbol of bipartisan support for the Civil War, northern
Republicans (calling themselves the National Union party) nominated him as Lincoln's
running mate in 1864. He fought relentlessly throughout his presidential term with the
Republican majority in Congress (which tried, unsuccessfully, to remove him from office
through impeachment). Tyler made six of the thirty-three nominations that I count as
occurring during a period of divided government, and Johnson made one.
17. Omitting Tyler's nominations (of which only one was successful), the success rate
increases to 62.9 percent (seventeen out of twenty-seven nominations). Omitting both Tyler
and Johnson, the success rate increases to 65.4 percent (seventeen out of twenty-six
nominations).
18. Again, a caveat is in order. Presidents actually made 116 Supreme Court
nominations through 2002 when the same political party controlled the White House and
the Senate. (The nominations made by Tyler and Johnson are excluded from this figure.)
Two, though, were withdrawn on technicalities and are not counted here: William Paterson
in 1783 (whose subsequent re-nomination is counted as one of the 114 nominations) and
Homer Thornberry in 1968. (Lyndon Johnson withdrew his nomination when the
anticipated vacancy of Justice Abe Fortas's seat failed to materialize.) If Tyler's six
nominations are included, the success rate drops to 85.8 percent (103 out of 120
nominations). If both Tyler and Andrew Johnson are included, the success rate drops to
85.1 percent (103 out of 121 nominations).
19. Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments
Process (Basic Books 1994).
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Compounding the mess have been contentious public policy
debates-a "cultural civil war," as reporter E.J. Dionne has put
it, over some of the most divisive issues imaginable (with race
and abortion at the forefront). 0 Race prompted senators to start
asking how judicial nominees might vote in specific cases. The
landmark Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education" served as the catalyst. Conservative southern
Democrats condemned the unanimous decision as an activist
ruling that changed the meaning of the Civil War amendments to
the constitution and invaded states' rights. It is probably no
coincidence that only since 1955 has every Supreme Court
nominee testified.22 Before 1955, testimony by nominees was a
rare phenomenon. No nominee testified until Harlan Fiske Stone
in 1925 (although some earlier nominees, such as George
Williams in 1873 and John Marshall Harlan in 1877, did
communicate in writing to the committee)." Of the next eighteen
nominees from Charles Evans Hughes in 1930 through Earl
Warren in 1954, only three testified (William 0. Douglas in
1939, Frank Murphy in 1940, and Robert Jackson in 1941).24
In the years after 1955, southern Democrats used their
questioning of nominees to decry the Court's activism in Brown
and to ask the nominees about their judicial philosophy.
Sometimes the questioning was indirect, as when Sen. James 0.
Eastland of Mississippi, the chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, asked William Brennan in 1957: "Do you think the
Constitution of the United States could have one meaning this
week and another meaning next week?" 25 The question clearly
20. Nightline, A Town Hall Meeting (ABC News Oct. 16, 1991) (comments of E.J.
Dionne) (notes taken during broadcast on file with author).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. The lone exception is Douglas Ginsburg in 1987, who would have testified, but was
forced to withdraw before committee hearings.
23. John Anthony Maltese, The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees 93-97 (Johns
Hopkins U. Press 1995).
24. John J. Parker wanted to testify in 1930, but did not. Later that same year, Owen

Roberts attended the hearings on his nomination in case the committee had any questions.
(It did not.) It has been erroneously reported that Reed did testify. See James A. Thorpe,
The Appearance of Supreme Court Nominees Before the Senate Judiciary Connittee, 18 J.
Pub. L. 371, 375 (1969). The transcript of the hearing shows no testimony, however, and
the committee was in executive session just long enough to vote on Reed. See Maltese,
supra n. 23, at 101, 167 n. 52.
25. See Carter, supra n. 19, at 67 (quoting Sen. Eastland).
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referred to Brown, which had overturned the "separate but

equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson," but did not directly
name it. On the other hand, southern Democrats asked Potter
Stewart very pointed questions about the case in 1959. After
Stewart evaded South Carolina Senator Olin Johnston's query as
to whether he was a "creative judge" or one who followed
precedent, Senator John McClellan of Arkansas asked point
blank: "Do you agree with the view, the reasoning and logic
applied ...and the philosophy expressed by the Supreme Court
in arriving in its decision in the case of Brown v. Board of
Education on May 17, 1954?" 27

Six years later, southern Democrats led the opposition to
Lyndon Johnson's nomination of Thurgood Marshall, the first
African American nominated to sit on the Court and the NAACP
lawyer who had argued and won in Brown. Marshall's
opponents used a variety tactics. Senator Sam Ervin of North
Carolina accused Marshall of repudiating and ignoring the
original intent of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.28
Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina asked Marshall
more than sixty complicated questions emphasizing facts about
political figures from the 1860s, all designed to make Marshall
look inept and hostile to original intent.29 Chairman Eastland
hinted that Marshall had Communist tendencies by noting that
one of Marshall's judicial opinions had cited a book by Herbert
Aptheker whom Eastland alleged "had been for many years an
avowed Communist and was the leading Communist
theoretician in the United States." 3° Marshall was ultimately
confirmed by a large margin (sixty-three to eleven), with all of
the opposition coming from southern senators.
Part of Richard Nixon's southern strategy for winning the
White House in the 1968 presidential election included a pledge
to appoint strict constructionists to the Supreme Court. His
success paved the way for Republican inroads into the south

26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. See Maltese, supra n. 23, at 109-10 (quoting Sen. McClellan); see also Carter,
supra n. 19, at 67-68.
28. Carter, supra n. 19, at 130.
29. Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents:A Political History of Appointments to
the Supreme Court, 293-94 (3d ed., Oxford U. Press 1992).
30. See Carter, supra n. 19, at 76 (quoting Sen. Eastland).
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(Nixon won North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Florida in 1968). But the Senate, controlled by the opposition,
defeated Nixon's first two attempts to appoint a southern strict
constructionist to the bench: Clement Haynsworth in 1969 and
G. Harrold Carswell in 1970. Both were defeated by a coalition
of northern Democrats and moderate to liberal Republicans
spurred on by lobbying from organized labor and the NAACP.
In retrospect, Haynsworth's defeat was probably a mistake.
Carswell's was not. His voting record as a federal judge
suggested a hostility to desegregation, but the smoking gun that
secured Carswell's defeat was a 1948 speech that he made when
running for a seat on the Georgia state legislature. "I am a
southerner by ancestry, birth, training, inclination, belief, and
practice," he had said.3
I believe the segregation of the races is proper and the only
practical and correct way of life in our states. I have always
so-believed, and I shall always so act.... I yield to no

man.., in the firm, vigorous belief in the principles of
white supremacy, and I shall always be so governed.
Nixon finally filled the vacancy with Harry Blackmun from
Minnesota who, ironically, went on to write the majority opinion
in Roe v. Wade.33 The seven-to-two ruling, which expanded the

unenumerated constitutional right of privacy, led to new debates
about judicial activism and plunged the Court into the middle of
a moral debate about abortion. By 1987, changes in the
composition of the Court had eroded its support for Roe to a
bare five-four majority. With Lewis Powell's resignation that
year, the Court was evenly divided. Powell's successor would
decide the fate of Roe. President Ronald Reagan's nomination of
Robert Bork, who had publicly stated his belief that Roe should
be overturned, created a storm of controversy. Opposition
Democrats controlled the Senate, and more than 400 interest
groups lobbied for and against Bork's confirmation. 3 Unlike his
31. See Maltese, supra n. 23, at 14 (quoting Carswell).
32. Id.; see also id. at chs. 1, 5 (including discussions of Carswell and Haynsworth).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Maltese, supra n. 23, at 36. Interest groups had participated sporadically in the
Supreme Court confirmation process since at least 1881, and had helped to defeat the
nominations of John J. Parker in 1930, Abe Fortas in 1968, Clement Haynsworth in 1969,
and G. Harrold Carswell in 1970, but the scope of their involvement in the Bork
confirmation was unprecedented. See Id. at ch. 3; see also Scott H. Ainsworth .& John
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predecessors, Bork willingly answered questions about his
judicial philosophy and how he might vote in specific cases.
That confirmation battle was a watershed in the sense that Bork
was clearly a highly qualified nominee. Unlike earlier nominees
who had been rejected, Bork could not be linked to conflict of
interest charges or overtly racist statements. Critics did charge
that Bork would "turn back the clock" on civil rights and
reproductive freedoms, but the real debate was about policy, not
character or qualifications.
In short, Bork's nomination brought to the forefront the
question of when it was legitimate for the Senate to reject a
nominee. Could it reject a nominee on pure policy grounds? On
this question, the constitution is not clear. Reagan had
complicated the matter by establishing the President's
Committee on Federal Judicial Selection, staffed by
representatives of the White House and the Department of
Justice, to screen all judicial nominees. Political scientist
Sheldon Goldman called it "the most systematic judicial
philosophical screening of judicial candidates ever seen in the
nation's history. 36 In essence, Reagan had institutionalized
what Huston had suggested to Nixon in his 1969 memo.
Critics called Reagan's screening an ideological litmus test
designed to promote judicial policymaking, and members of his
administration did not disagree. White House counsel Fred
Fielding said the system was designed to choose "people of a
certain judicial philosophy," and Attorney General Edwin
Meese III said that it was a way to "institutionalize the Reagan
revolution so it can't be set aside no matter what happens in
future presidential elections." 3 Meese overstated the power of
judicial appointments, but given the life tenure enjoyed by
federal judges, careful oversight of judicial selection would
allow Reagan to influence judicial policymaking long after
7

Anthony Maltese, National Grange Influence on the Confirmation of Stanley Matthews, 20
Soc. Sci. History 41 (Spring 1996).
35. For an excellent overview of the relevant constitutional language, and the framers'
debates over it, see James E. Gauch, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court
Appointments, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (1989).
36. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's JudicialLegacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing
Up, 72 Judicature 318, 319-20 (Apr.-May 1989).
37. Fielding and Meese were both quoted in David M. O'Brien, Judicial Roulette
(Priority Press 1988). See id. at 61-62, 21-24.
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leaving the White House. By the time Reagan did leave office,
he had set a record for the number of lower federal judges
appointed: 290 district court judges and seventy-eight appeals
court judges." He had also elevated William Rehnquist to Chief
Justice and appointed three associate justices to the Supreme
Court (Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony
Kennedy).
Democrats who controlled the Senate asked: If the
president selects nominees on the basis of their judicial
philosophy (how they will vote in certain cases), why can't the
Senate, under its constitutional power to offer "advice and
consent," reject nominees for the same reason? Liberals became
the ones applying strict scrutiny to judicial nominees and asking
questions at confirmation hearings about their judicial
philosophy. In the end, they rejected Bork's nomination.
Republicans cried foul. President Reagan said that "the process
of confirming a Supreme Court Justice has been reduced to a
political, partisan struggle." 39 Yet the Senate has rejected
nominees on purely political grounds since the very earliest days
of our history (witness the Senate's rejection of George
Washington's nomination of John Rutledge to be chief justice of
the Supreme Court in 1795-an event I have described
elsewhere as the first borking of a Supreme Court nominee).4°
Lord Bryce, the British chronicler of American government,
observed in the 1800s that the Senate could reject a nominee
"on any ground which it pleased, as for instance, if it
disapproved his political affiliations, or wished to spite the
President.", 4' Even George Washington wrote in 1789 that "as

38. Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt
through Reagan 348-50, 354-56 (Yale U. Press 1997) (tbl. 9.1, 9.2). The number increases
slightly if you include Reagan's appointment of non-Article III judges, who staff
specialized courts and do not have life tenure.
39. Ronald W. Reagan, Informal Exchange With Reporters on the Nomination of
Robert H. Bork To Be an Associate Justice (Oct. I, 1987) in Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents vol. 23, no. 39, 1105 (Pres. Docs. Servs., Off. of the Fed. Register,
Natl. Archives & Records Admin. Oct. 5, 1987).
40. Maltese, supra n. 23, at 31; see also id. at ch. 2 (describing circumstances of
Rutledge's nomination and Senate's failure to confirm his appointment).
41. Eugene W. Hickock, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of Advice and
Consent, in Judicial Selection: Merit, Ideology, and Politics 10 (Nati. Leg. Ctr. for the Pub.
Interest 1990) (quoting Lord Bryce).
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the President has a right to nominate without assigning reasons,
so has the Senate a right to dissent without giving theirs."42
In fact, one might argue that the Bork battle and the
ensuing confirmation mess is not so much a sign that the process
itself is broken, as it is a byproduct of the gridlock created by
divided government and an electorate unwilling to give a clear
mandate to a single political party-or even a president. Neither
George W. Bush in 2000, nor Bill Clinton in either 1992 or
1996, received fifty percent of the popular vote. (Indeed, Al
Gore won the popular vote in 2000.) Even Ronald Reagan's
"landslide" in 1980 amounted to only 50.7 percent of the
popular vote (although he won 90.9 percent of the electoral
college vote). It is this stalemate that has fostered the
confirmation mess.
Stalemate seemed particularly inevitable after the contested
2000 presidential election. When George W. Bush took office in
January 2001, the Senate was evenly divided between
Democrats and Republicans for the first time since 1883. Bush
was the first president since Benjamin Harrison in 1888 to take
office after losing the popular vote.43 In the highly controversial
case, Bush v. Gore,44 a five-four Supreme Court stopped further
recounts in Florida, thereby guaranteeing that Bush would win
the White House. Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman was not
alone in calling the decision an unprincipled ruling, but he went
even further. As he wrote in February 2001:
In our democracy, there is one basic check on a runaway
Court: presidential elections. And a majority of the justices
have conspired to eliminate this check. The Supreme Court
cannot be permitted to arrange for its own succession. To
allow this president to serve as the Court's agent is a
fundamental violation of the separation of powers. It is one
thing for unelected judges to exercise the sovereign power
42. George Washington, Conference with a Committee of the United States Senate,
August 8, 1789, in The Papers of George Washington 401 (W.W. Abbot ed., U. Press of
Va. 1989).

43. As a point of comparison, Gore's popular vote margin of 539,898 votes over Bush
was almost five times the size of John F. Kennedy's 1960 popular vote margin of 114,673
votes over Richard Nixon, and almost 30,000 more votes than Nixon's 1968 margin of
510,645 votes over Hubert Humphrey. See Kernell & Jacobson, supra n. 7, at 579-80 (app.
8) (showing vote totals).
44. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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of judicial review; it's quite another for them to insulate
themselves yet further from popular control. When sitting
justices retire or die, the Senate should refuse to confirm
any nominations offered up by President Bush.... The
right-wing bloc on the Court should not be permitted to
extend its control for a decade or more simp!X because it
has put George W. Bush into the White House.
Bush entered office under a cloud of illegitimacy and with
the highest disapproval rating of any incoming president since
polling began (twenty-five percent according to the Gallup
Poll). 4 When Democrats regained control of the Senate in May
2001, it seemed unlikely that Bush could achieve sweeping
change on the judiciary. Nominating the types of ideal justices
that he had touted during his presidential campaign (Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas) would surely provoke strong
Senate opposition, especially given the highly partisan voting
patterns observed there. An analysis by Congressional Quarterly
of roll-call voting in the Senate during Bush's first six months in
office showed a dramatic increase in partisan voting. It found
"party unity" (defined as the percentage of recorded floor votes
on which a majority of one party voted against a majority of the
other party) up from 48.6 percent in 2000 to 64.1 percent in the
first months of the Bush administration.47
At the same time, the president's public approval was
slipping. A Gallup poll conducted September 7-10, 2001,
showed it at a new low: fifty-one percent.48 Then came the
dramatic terrorist attacks on September 11 and Bush's approval
ratings skyrocketed. Virtually overnight they jumped to eightysix percent approval. Gallup called the thirty-five-point jump
45. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, in The American Prospect (Feb. 12,
2001) (online edition) (available at <http://www.americanprospect.com>; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
46. David W. Moore, Initial Job Approval for Bush at 57 Percent, But Highest
Disapproval of Any President Since Polling Began (Feb. 6, 2001) (Gallup poll release)
(available at <http://www.gallup.com/subscription/?m=f&c-id=9878> (subscription-only
service); copy of summary on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
47. Dana Milbank, In the Rose Garden, Bush, Aides Revel in Their Successes, Wash.
Post A4 (Aug. 4, 2001).
48. See Bush Job Approval Was at 51% Immediately Before Tuesday's Attacks (Sept.
12, 2001) (Gallup poll analysis) (available at <http://www.gallup.com/subscription/?m=f&

c_id=10843> (subscription-only service); copy of summary on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).

CONFIRMATION GRIDLOCK: JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

"the highest rally effect for any president in the past half
century."4 9 By September 22, 2001, Bush's approval rating had
reached ninety percent: the highest ever recorded by the Gallup
organization for a president.50 Though moderating some, Bush's
approval ratings remained high through 2002 (staying above
eighty percent for almost six months, above seventy percent for
another four, and not dipping below sixty-one percent through
December 2002).
Bush attempted to use his newly found support to secure
his policy initiatives and appoint conservative judicial nominees.
He reiterated his vow to get "good conservative judges
appointed to the bench and approved by the United States
Senate.'' But despite an initial period of bipartisanship after
September 11, the Senate objected and handed President Bush
his first defeat of a judicial nominee on March 14, 2002, when
the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected his nomination of
District Judge Charles W. Pickering of Mississippi to fill a
vacancy on the Fifth Circuit. Voting strictly along party lines,
the nineteen-member Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the
nomination by a vote of ten-to-nine, and refused to send the
nomination out of committee for a full Senate vote. Race again
played a role in the defeat. Democrats pointed to Pickering's
previous record as a judge and his contacts, as a Mississippi
state legislator in the 1970s, with the Sovereignty
Commission--created by the state in 1956 to lead the effort to
preserve segregation (although a thorough investigation of
Pickering's past by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution has since
suggested that the evidence does not support the charges of
racism leveled against him). 2
49. David W. Moore, Confidence in Leaders. Americans Rally Around Government
Leaders in Wake of Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 14, 2001) (Gallup poll analysis) (available at

<http://www.gallup.com> (subscription-only service); copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
50. Gallup began its presidential approval polls in 1938 when Franklin Roosevelt was
in the White House. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Gallup Tuesday Briefing: Bush Approval
Ratings One Year After the Peak (Oct. 1, 2002) (available at <http://www.gallup.compoll/
tb/goverPubli/20021001b.asp?Version=p> (subscription-only service); copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
51. Reuters, President Says "Good, Conservative" Judges Needed, San Diego UnionTribune A-6 (Mar. 29, 2002) (quoting Pres. George W. Bush).
52. Neil A. Lewis, Divisive Words: JudicialAppointments, 151 N.Y. Times A30 (Dec.
17, 2002); Janita Poe & Tom Baxter, Trials of a Southern Judge: Evidence Doesn't
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White House press secretary Ari Fleischer criticized the
Democratic leadership in the Senate for turning Pickering's
confirmation into a political battle-one "marred by
partisanship and ideology, when it should be marked by success
and bipartisanship." 53 Fleischer added:
The American people want to be able to look at
Washington and say that even though they have differences
of approach and differences of opinion, at the end of the
day the Democrats and Republicans are able to get together
and get things done for the country. And that's what's so
distressing about the process that the Senate leadership has
chosen to take in this matter with Judge Pickering. They
have chosen a 4rocess that is a partisan one, that defies
bipartisanship."
Democrats responded that it was the president who had
defied bipartisanship by failing to nominate consensus
candidates and for choosing, instead, to "stack the courts" with
conservative ideologues.55 To them, consensus nominees were
especially important given the tenuousness of the president's
electoral victory in the 2000 election. Where was the mandate
for a major ideological overhaul of the federal courts? As
Senator Charles Schumer of New York put it:
The choice is this: nominate reasonable, moderate men and
women who belong on the bench and we'll confirm them
right away. Nominate ideologues willing to sacrifice the
interests of many to serve the interests of a narrow few, and
you'll have a fight on your hands. It's that simple.56
Democrats were also angry' about actions taken by
Republicans-both during the last six years of the Clinton
administration, and during the brief period from January through

Support Charges of Racism Against Charles Pickering, Atlanta Journal-Constitution I E

(Mar. 9, 2003).
53. Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing (Mar. 14, 2002) (transcript and audio available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov>; copy of transcript on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).

54. Id.
55. Joan Biskupic, Senate Panel Rejects Bush's Judicial Nominee 10-9, USA Today 8A

(Mar. 15, 2002) (quoting Sen. Schumer).
56. CBS News, Squabbling Over Judges (May 9, 2002) (video of Sen. Schumer's
remarks) (available at <http://www.cbsnews.com>; copy of transcript on file with Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process).
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May 2001, when Republicans had nominal control of the Senate.
During the Clinton administration, the Republicans orchestrated
a major slowdown of the Senate confirmation process and
worked hard to block Clinton nominees. The slowdown had its
genesis when Republicans won control of the Senate in the 1994
midterm elections, but it really took off after Clinton's reelection in 1996. Pressure from conservative groups, such as the
Judicial Selection Monitoring Project, also helped to precipitate
the Republican strategy. The Judicial Selection Monitoring
Project criticized Republican senators for voting to support
Clinton's nominees in 1995 and 1996. (The Senate confirmed
ninety-nine percent of Clinton's first-term judicial nominees
without a roll-call vote.)
Since the 1994 midterm elections, Clinton had consulted
with members of the Republican majority in the Senate. He
seemed less interested in appointing ideologically rigid judges
than with using his appointments to create a demographically
representative judiciary filled with more women and
minorities.57 Early studies of the voting behavior of Clinton's
first-term judges (including those appointed when Democrats
controlled the Senate) showed a moderate voting record on the
bench.58 His nominees also had the highest American Bar
Association ratings of the past four presidents.' Nonetheless, a
fundraising letter for the Judicial Selection Monitoring Project
signed by Robert Bork in September 1997 charged that "over
the past 41 years, [Clinton's] more than 200 ...judicial
appointments have been drawn almost exclusively from the
ranks of the liberal elite. These judges blazed an activist trail,
creating an out-of-control judiciary., 60 Earlier that year, the
Project had sent an open letter to President Clinton and all one
57. Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton's Nontraditional Judges:
Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 Judicature 68 (Sept.-Oct. 1994).
58. Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp, & Donald Songer, The Voting Behavior of
President Clinton's Judicial Appointees, 80 Judicature 16, 20 (July-Aug. 1996); Sheldon
Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 Judicature 265 (May-June
1999); Nancy Scherer, Are Clinton's Judges "Old" Democrats or "New" Democrats? 84
Judicature 151 (Nov.-Dec. 2000); Alliance for Justice Jud. Selection Project, Fourteenth
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary § I(C) (2000) (available at <http://www.afj.org/

jsp/report2000>; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
59. Goldman & Slotnick, supra n. 58.
60. Henry Weinstein, Drive Seeks to Block Clinton Judicial Nominees, L.A. Times A3
(Oct. 26, 1997).
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hundred senators announcing that it would "promote judicial
restraint and fight judicial activism with whatever tools and
resources are legitimately at our disposal." 6'
Republican senators responded to the pressure in 1997 by
stalling the confirmation of the president's nominees to the
lower federal courts. Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri was
among the leaders of the slowdown.62 In October 1997, the
Judicial Selection Monitoring Project released a fifteen-minute
videotape as part of a $1.4 million fund-raising campaign to
block the confirmation of "activist liberal judges."63 The tape
portrayed the specter of "judicial tyranny" through Clinton
appointments, and highlighted several examples to back up its
claim. 64 A Los Angeles Times analysis of the tape and its claims
noted that several of the tape's examples of "judicial tyranny"
were actually decisions made by judges that President George
H.W. Bush had appointed. For example, the tape showcased a
1997 decision by District Judge Stewart Dalzell to release from
prison a woman convicted of murder in 1992. The tape clearly
implied that Clinton's judges were soft on crime and
unconcerned with victims' rights. But Dalzell was appointed by
President Bush in 1991 and, as the Los Angeles Times
concluded: "Nowhere on the tape are the judge's detailed
reasons for releasing the woman, including his conclusions that
another man committed the murder and that there were 25
instances of police and prosecutorial misconduct."65
In March 1997, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay,
Republican of Texas, further escalated the rhetoric and
suggested that congressional Republicans should impeach liberal
federal judges.66 Attorney General Janet Reno responded by
saying that DeLay's "heated rhetoric" had the effect of

61. Press Release, Alliance for Justice Jud. Selection Project (Jan. 23, 1997) (notes
made from press release on file with author).
62. Tim Poor, Judge Not; If John Ashcroft Can Help It, A Lot of President Clinton's
Nominees to the FederalBench Aren't Going to Make It, St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1B (Nov.
2, 1997).
63. Weinstein, supra n. 60.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Michael Kelly, Judge Dread, New Republic 6 (Mar. 31, 1997) (quoting Rep.
DeLay).
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undermining the "very credibility of the judiciary."6 7 She also

criticized Senate Republicans for stalling the confirmation of
Clinton nominees, as did the president in a radio address on
September 27, 1997. Clinton lamented the "vacancy crisis in our
courts," and charged that the Senate's "failure to act on my
nominations, or even to give many of my nominees a hearing,
represents the worst of partisan politics."" The president noted
that there were nearly a hundred vacancies on federal courts, but
that the Senate had confirmed only seventeen judges in all of
1996-the lowest election-year confirmation rate in forty
years.69 In comparison, the Senate confirmed 101 judges in
1994. 70
Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Orrin Hatch,
Republican of Utah, replied that the "Senate's advise-andconsent function should not be reduced to a mere numbers
game. The confirmation of an individual to serve for life as a
Federal judge is a serious matter and should be treated as
such.", 7' Senate Republican leader Trent Lott was already on
record saying: "Should we take our time on these federal
judges? Yes. Do I have any apologies? Only one: I probably
moved too many already."" Republicans also charged that
Clinton was slow to nominate judges and that he was
responsible for many of the vacancies on the federal judiciary.73
In his 1997 year-end report to Congress on the federal
judiciary, the Chief Justice pointed out that by the end of 1997,
one in ten seats on the federal judiciary were vacant, twenty-six
of them had been vacant for at least eighteen months, and a third

67. Associated Press, Reno Criticizes Senate in Delay on Nominees, 146 N.Y. Times
A15 (Aug. 6, 1997).
68. Ronald Brownstein, GOP Stall Tactics Damage Judiciary, PresidentCharges, L.A.
Times AI (Sept. 28, 1997).
69. Id.
70. Annual Report, Alliance for Justice Jud. Selection Project 2 (1994).
71. Reno Criticizes Senate in Delay on Nominees, supra n. 67.
72. People for the American Way, President Bush, the Senate, and the Federal

Judiciary (2001) (quoting Sen. Lott) (available at <http://www.pfaw.org>; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
73. Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Sen., Address (Fed. J. Assn., May 14, 1997) (copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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of the seats on the Ninth Circuit were vacant.74 He rebuked his
fellow conservatives for "serious delays in the appointment
process," a tactic that he said was threatening the nation's
"quality of justice."75 ",The Senate is surely under no obligation
to confirm any particular nominee," Rehnquist wrote, "but after
the necessary time for inquiry it should vote him up or down. In
the latter case, the president can then send up another
nominee." 76 Senate Republicans backed away from their stall
tactics and the backlog of vacancies eased up in 1998.
But in 1999, as the 2000 election loomed, Republicans
again slowed down the confirmation process. Despite Attorney
General Meese's claim that President Reagan's judicial
appointments would institutionalize the Reagan revolution so it
can't be set aside no matter what happens in future presidential
elections," 77 President Clinton-just ten years after Reagan left
office-was close to appointing a new majority on the federal
bench. Senate Republicans wanted to prevent that, and they
hoped that a Republican president would be elected in 2000 to
fill any remaining vacancies that they managed to keep open.
As the 106th Congress prepared to adjourn in November
1999, the Senate had confirmed only twenty-five of Clinton's
seventy judicial nominations made that year. The Congressional
Black Caucus and other lawmakers and legal experts began to
suggest that the president use his constitutional power from
Article II, section 2 to make temporary "recess appointments"
to fill some of those posts. Such appointments, which can only
be made when the Senate is in recess and only last until the end
of the next session of Congress, had been used by presidents
since George Washington. As a point of comparison, Jimmy
Carter made sixty-nine recess appointments during his four
years in office, Ronald Reagan made 238 during his eight years,
George H.W. Bush made seventy-eight during his four years,

74. William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary 7 (available
at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov>; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
75. Id. at 7, 12.

76. Id. at 9.
77. O'Brien, supra n. 37.
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and Clinton had made sixty-eight in his first seven years."
Judicial recess appointments were somewhat more problematic
than other types of recess appointments because of the Article
III requirement that federal judges serve "during good
Behaviour." Still, judicial recess appointments were common
(some 300 throughout our history, with fifteen to the Supreme
Court-ranging from Washington's appointment of John
Rutledge in 1795 to Dwight Eisenhower's appointments of Earl
Warren in 1954, William Brennan in 1957, and Potter Stewart in
1959), and their constitutionality had been upheld by the Ninth
Circuit as recently as 1985.' 9
In the summer of 1999, Clinton had used his recess
appointment power to appoint James Hormel as ambassador to
Luxembourg. A majority of the Senate supported Hormel's
nomination, but it had languished for two years. A small group
of Republican senators including James Inhofe of Oklahoma
prevented a full Senate vote on the nomination because they said
the sixty-six year-old Hormel, who was homosexual, would
promote a gay agenda and was unfit to represent the United
States.80 In retaliation for Clinton's recess appointment of
Hormel, Inhofe put a block on all other Clinton appointments,
which he lifted only when Clinton agreed to notify Senate
leaders in advance of any future recess appointments." But
several months later, proponents of judicial recess appointments
pointed to ongoing examples of Senate obstructionism that were
similar to the one used against Hormel.
For example, Clinton's nomination of Richard A. Paez to
the Ninth Circuit had been pending for three and a half years,
and his nomination of Marsha L. Berzon-also to the Ninth
Circuit-had been pending for almost two years.82 There had
78. Deirdre Shesgreen, President's "Recess Power" May Relieve Jam of Bench
Nominees, St. Louis Post-Dispatch A10 (Oct. 31, 1999); Kamen, Recess-Appointment
Repercussions, Wash. Post A2 (Jan. 26, 2000).

79. U.S. v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (1985) (discussing historical practices dating back
to the time of the framers, and noting frequency of recess appointments).
80. Marc Sandalow, Clinton Bypasses Senate, Names Hormel Ambassador, S.F. Chron.
AI (June 5, 1999).
81. David E. Rosenbaum, Clinton Vow to Congress Ends a Threat to His Nominations,
148 N.Y. Times (June 17, 1999).
82. Helen Dewar, In Session: Congress; Scores of Judges Float in Senate Logjam,
Wash. Post A19 (Nov. 8, 1999).
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also been long delays on nominations to the conservative Fourth
Circuit. No African American had ever served on the Fourth
Circuit (covering North and South Carolina, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Maryland), even though it was the federal circuit
with the highest percentage of African American population in
the country.83 Clinton was determined to appoint an African
American there, but conservative Republicans led by Sen. Jesse
Helms of North Carolina had blocked every African American
nominee that Clinton had submitted 4 Three never received a
hearing. 5 A fourth, James A. Beaty, Jr., was approved by the
Senate Judiciary Committee, but his nomination was blocked
from receiving a vote of the full Senate. Helms claimed that
filling the four vacancies on the fifteen-member appeals court
was unnecessary and would actually make the court less
efficient (a position he reversed when George W. Bush became
president).86 And, in October 1999, the Senate had outright
rejected a judicial nominee by a full vote of the Senate for the
first time since Robert Bork in 1987. The nominee, Ronnie
White, had been tapped by Clinton to fill a federal District Court
post in Missouri. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved him
in a bipartisan vote, but he became caught up in the judicial logjam that stalled his nomination for the next two years. When his
name finally went to the floor of the Senate for a vote, Missouri
Senator John Ashcroft led the opposition, calling White, who is
an African American, "pro-criminal." 8 7 The Senate defeated
White along a party-line vote. Later, when President Bush
nominated Ashcroft to be Attorney General, Ashcroft had to
respond to repeated allegations that he had distorted White's
record.8"
Clinton rejected suggestions that he make judicial recess
appointments when the Senate adjourned in late 1999, but he did
83. Joan Biskupic, Politics Snares Court Hopes of Minorities and Women, USA Today
IA (Aug. 22, 2000).
84. Id.
85. FourteenthAnnual Report, supra n. 58, at § I(B)(2).
86. David Firestone, With New Administration, Partisan Battle Resumes Over a
FederalAppeals Bench, 150 N.Y. Times A 13 (May 21, 2001).
87. Deirdre Shesgreen, Ashcroft Leads Attack as Senate Weighs White's Nomination,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch Al (Oct. 5, 1999).
88. Deirdre Shesgreen, Ashcroft's Treatment of Nominees May Haunt Him, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch A8 (Jan. 11, 2001).
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make nine recess appointments to a variety of non-judicial posts.

Sen. Inhofe felt that two of the recess appointments, Sarah M.
Fox to the National Labor Relations Board and Stuart E.
Weisberg to the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, violated Clinton's agreement to clear recess
appointments with Senate leaders in advance.89 Once again he
put a hold on all of Clinton's judicial nominations, this time
arguing that none should be confirmed for the remaining year of
Clinton's term. Apparently among those who initially supported
Inhofe's hold was John Ashcroft.9 ° Senate Majority Trent Lott,
however, rejected Inhofe's position, and convinced the Senate to
confirm two judges in February 2000. 9' Still, the Senate
confirmed only thirty-nine of the eighty-one judicial nominees
that Clinton sent to the Senate in 2000. In all, forty-two judicial
nominees remained unconfirmed when Clinton left office in
January 2001. Thirty-eight of them never received a hearing.92
One of Clinton's last acts as president was to resort to a judicial
recess appointment, making Richmond lawyer Roger Gregory
the first African American ever to sit on the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. 93
The bitter taste of the Republican slowdown stayed in the
mouths of Democrats when Bush became president in 2001.
Democrats also resented efforts by Senate Republicans in the
first months of the Bush administration to take away from them
the power that opposition Republicans had used against Clinton
nominees. As part of its slow-down of judicial nominations
during Clinton's last term, Republicans used the so-called blueslip procedure, which allows senators from the state where the
federal judicial vacancy occurs to prevent committee hearings
on that nominee. 94 The Senate institutionalized the practice in the
89. Kamen, supra n. 78.
90. Deirdre Shesgreen, Senator Says Ashcroft Supports Plan to Block Judicial

Appointments, St. Louis Post-Dispatch A 14 (Feb. 9, 2000).
91. Associated Press,

Lott Persuades GOP in Senate to Allow Two Judges'

Confirmation, St. Louis Post-Dispatch AI0 (Feb. 11, 2000).
92. Fourteenth Annual Report, supra n. 58, at § II(A)(1).
93. Dan Eggen, Clinton Names Black Judge to Appeals Court; Recess Choice for

Richmond Circuit is Challenge to GOP, Wash. Post A l (Dec. 28, 2000).
94. For a more detailed discussion of this process, see Joseph A. Pika, John Anthony
Maltese & Norman C. Thomas, The Politics of the Presidency 257-61 (5th ed., CQ Press
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1940s. As interpreted during the Clinton administration by the
Republican chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin
Hatch, home-state senators of both political parties could use the
blue-slip procedure to block hearings. Thus, a home-state
Republican (like Jesse Helms in the Fourth Circuit) could block
a Democratic nominee put forward by President Clinton. Once a
fellow Republican became president, however, Hatch abruptly
shifted gears. With President Bush making the nominations,
Hatch now said that support of a home-state Republican should
overcome the opposition of a home-state Democrat. Democrats
reacted with fury. All nine Democrats on the Judiciary
Committee signed a letter of protest that all fifty Senate
Democrats supported.95 The New York Times editorialized that
Hatch's reversal was both ironic and audacious, since
Republicans had for six years "routinely obstructed" Clinton's
judicial nominations and were now trying to remove the
possibility that Democrats could do the same." Before the
impasse could be resolved, however, Sen. Jeffords defected, the
Democrats took control of the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy,
the Vermont Democrat, became chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and the blue-slip procedure remained unchanged.
With Democrats in control of the Senate, Republicans
charged them with a judicial slowdown. President Bush had
submitted sixty judicial nominations, but by the beginning of
October 2001 the Senate had confirmed only eight. Emboldened
by President Bush's high public approval ratings after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, and claiming that judicial
vacancies would hamper the war on terrorism, Senate
Republicans mounted a filibuster against a $15.6 billion foreignaid spending bill, saying that it was retaliation for Democratic
stonewalling of judicial nominees." Democrats denied a
deliberate slowdown of the sort Republicans had orchestrated
under Clinton, pointing out that the Republican-controlled
Senate had held no judicial confirmation hearings from January
through May. They also pointed out that since their taking
95. Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Press Bush for Input on Judges, Wash. Post A4
(Apr. 28, 2001).
96. Editorial, Doing Business in the Senate, 150 N.Y. Times A22 (June 19, 2001).
97. Helen Dewar, Foreign Aid Bill Held Up by GOP; Senators Demand Action on
Nominees, Wash. Post A3 (Oct. 13, 2001).
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control of the Senate in June, several events had intervened to
slow the legislative agenda. These included the summer recess,
the terrorist attacks, and the major disruptions caused by the
anthrax scare on Capitol Hill. Senator Leahy further countered
that they were "ahead of the pace of confirmations for judicial
nominees in the first year of the Clinton administration and the
pace in the first year of the first Bush administration." 98 The
Chief Justice also re-entered the fray, saying in his 2001 yearend report that after the tragic events of September 11
the role of courts becomes even more important in order to
enforce the rule of law. To continue functioning effectively
and efficiently, however, the courts must be appropriately
staffed. This means that necessary judgeships must be
created and judicial vacancies must be timely filled with
well-qualified candidates.99
In the ensuing months, the Democratic majority on the
Judiciary Committee rejected not only Bush's nomination of
Charles Pickering, but also his nomination of Priscilla Owen
(also to the Fifth Circuit), describing both as ideological
extremists. Democrats renewed their pledge to confirm moderate
judges but, as Senator Schumer put it, they were "not going to
be bullied into letting this administration stack the courts for
decades to come." '0 President Bush quickly condemned the
Democrats for their judicial "obstructionism," and turned it into
a campaign issue for the 2002 midterm elections. Campaigning
against Senator Max Cleland of Georgia, a Democrat, shortly
after the Pickering defeat, Bush said: "We're going to have
more fights when it comes to the judiciary." He then criticized
Cleland for voting against Pickering: "I put up a good man from
Mississippi the other day, and I don't remember the senior
senator from Georgia defending this man's honor." 101
98. Dewar, supra n. 97 (quoting Sen. Leahy).
99. Charles Lane, Rehnquist Decries Vacancies; Stalled Judgeships Hurt War on

Terror, ChiefJustice Says, Wash. Post A2 (Jan. 1,2002) (quoting the Chief Justice).
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Then, on May 9, 2002-the one-year anniversary of the
president's announcement of his first eleven nominations to the
Courts of Appeals-the White House launched an offensive.
Just as Clinton had done five years earlier, Bush decried the
"vacancy crisis" on federal courts. 0 2 Speaking in the Roosevelt
Room of the White House, Bush accused the Democrats of
playing "raw politics" on the issue.' °3 The White House also
released a Fact Sheet highlighting the crisis.' 4 In the coming
months, the president focused attention on that crisis again and
again, and Republicans around the country joined the refrain.
The president made the vacancy crisis the topic of his weekly
radio address the week before the midterm elections, charging
the Democrats with "a disturbing failure to meet a responsibility
under the Constitution" and of "harming the administration of
justice in America." "Our country deserves better," he
concluded.' 5 Even ninety-nine year-old Strom Thurmond,
who-with Jesse Helms-had spearheaded efforts to block
President Clinton's nominees to the Fourth Circuit, took to the
floor of the Senate on October 9, 2002, to express outrage at the
Democrats for delaying a confirmation vote on his former aide,
Dennis W. Shedd, whom Bush had nominated to sit on the
Fourth Circuit. "I am hurt and disappointed by this egregious act
of destructive politics," he said. "In my 48 years in the United
States Senate, I have never been treated in such a manner." 106
Republicans regained control of the Senate in the midterm
elections, and the road seemed clear for President Bush to renominate Charles Pickering and Priscilla Owen, and to push
forward other conservative nominees. But then the new Senate
majority leader, Trent Lott-Pickering's strongest supporter102. George W. Bush, Pres. of U.S., Remarks After Meeting with Members of Congress
on Federal Judicial Nominations (May 9, 2002) (transcript and audio available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov>; copy of transcript on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
103. Id.
104. White House Fact Sheet, Judicial Vacancy Crisis (May 9, 2002) (available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov>; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
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was forced to resign his leadership post after his controversial
remarks at the 100th birthday party of Strom Thurmond. Lott
said Mississippi was "proud" to have voted for Thurmond in his
segregationist 1948 campaign for president on the Dixiecrat
ticket, adding: "If the rest of the country had followed our lead,
we wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years,
either." 107Lott had said almost the identical thing in 1980, had
said in 1983, "Sometimes, I feel closer to Jefferson Davis than
any other man in America," had praised the Council of
Conservative Citizens in 1992 (saying it stood for "the right
principles and the right philosophy," despite its roots in the
white citizens councils of the segregation era), had voted against
the Martin Luther King, Jr., national holiday in 1983, and was
the only senator in a ninety-three-to-one vote to reject President
Bush's 2001 nomination of Roger Gregory, the African
American whom President Clinton had made a recess
appointment and whom Bush nominated to the Fourth Circuit
when he became president.' °8 Concerns about Pickering's
attitudes on race took on new significance, and even Lott-in
his interview on Black Entertainment Television shortly before
he resigned his leadership post-had said about Pickering: "The
things-many of the things said against him he was not guilty
of. But having said that, you know, I'll have to weigh all my
actions differently and more carefully." '0 In their subsequent
searches for judicial nominees, it appeared that the Bush
administration would have to be concerned about the issue of
race.
The Lott affair seemed to signal at least a short-term
setback for the Bush administration's attempts to appoint
conservative jurists to the bench. Emboldened, Democrats
renewed their pledge to block (through use of a filibuster, if
need be) judges that they perceived to be ideologues. Fearing
that Senator Hatch, who had regained chairmanship of the
Judiciary Committee, would follow through on his 2001 threat
107. Jesse J. Holland, Lott Comments Give Pickering Critics New Ammunition Against
Renewed Nomination (Dec. 13, 2002) (AP release) (quoting Sen. Lott) (copy on file with
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108. Derrick Z. Jackson, Brother Lott's Real Record, Boston Globe A23 (Dec. 18,
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to alter the blue-slip procedure, Democrats also threatened to
filibuster Bush nominees if Republicans took away blue-slip
power from home-state Democrats."O But neither Bush nor
Hatch backed down. On January 7, 2003, President Bush resubmitted thirty judicial nominations that had not been
confirmed by the 107th Congress. The list included both Charles
Pickering and Priscilla Owen."' Then, at the first January
meeting of the Judiciary Committee, Hatch announced changes
in the blue-slip procedure that would prevent home-state
Democrats from blocking Bush nominees."12 Hatch's decision
allowed the Committee to hold hearings on Ninth Circuit
nominee Carolyn Kuhl in April over the objection of home-state
Senator Barbara Boxer, the California Democrat. In a letter to
Chairman Hatch, Boxer complained of his "disregard" of her
''prerogatives as one of the home-state senators," and charged
that Hatch's decision to alter the blue-slip procedure "will have
ramifications for years to come." ,13
Democrats did not back down either. In February, they
mounted a successful filibuster against Miguel Estrada, Bush's
nominee for a vacancy on the D.C. Circuit. Although Democrats
recognized that such filibusters had to be used sparingly, they
had shown that they could follow through on their threat to use
them. While deciding whether to filibuster the nomination of
Priscilla Owen, which had secured Judiciary Committee
approval by a ten-to-nine party-line vote, Democrats on the
Judiciary Committee joined Republicans to confirm another
Texas nominee for the Fifth Circuit, Edward Prado, by a
unanimous vote on April 3. The vote suggested that Democrats
would support moderate nominees put forward by the
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Political expediency explains many of the actions of
participants in the judicial-appointment process. At various
times both liberals and conservatives have supported strict
scrutiny of judicial nominees and decried judicial activism. The
conservatives' rallying cry against judicial activism at the start
of the twenty-first century is exactly the same rallying cry used
by liberals in the 1920s and '30s decrying the judicial activism
of conservative judges who read economic rights into the
constitution. "0 Democrats supported the borking of nominees
when Reagan was president, but urged a kinder, gentler
treatment of nominees when Clinton was in office. Republicans
embraced the confirmation slowdown of judicial nominees when
Clinton was president, but condemned it when Bush became
president. At root, the judicial appointment process is a political
one: shaped by changing political dynamics and balances of
power. As long as the balance of power remains divided, the
process promises to be a contentious one.
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